The Roots Of The British-Led "Disinformation" Special Ops Campaign In Europe
The "Integrity Initiative" launched by the illest minds of the British Government in 2015 claimed to fight "Russian propaganda", but ultimately served as a test-trial for today's increasing censorship
1. INTRODUCTION
The Integrity Initiative (II) is an organ of the British deep-state, that was formed by branches of the British Government in 2015, with the motto of “defending democracy against disinformation”. The initiative was initially exposed in 2018 by Anonymous, with the group proceeding to produce an increasing amount of documents through to 2019, exposing the true nature of the faction.
Swiss Propaganda Research (renamed to ‘Swiss Policy Research (SPR)’ in 2020), an independent non-profit research group investigating and analysing Swiss and international geopolitical propaganda, dubbed the release of the II documents as [1]:
The biggest Secret Service exposure since Edward Snowden … (it was) almost completely ignored by commercially-controlled media.
The Integrity Initiative now accounts for the majority of the budget of a Scottish-registered ‘charity’ named the Institute of Statecraft (IoS), which was founded by Daniel Lafayeedney and Chris Donnelly - the latter being someone we will revisit later - in 2006. Most of the outright funding for the programme - ~ £2.6m p/y - comes from the Conflict Security and Stability Fund’s Russian Language Programme, now merged with a secret Counter Disinformation and Media Programme. Office space in Central London and most of the staff salaries, appear to be provided as a covert benefit in kind.
An examination of past and present posts held by individuals associated with the II indicate that specialists in military intelligence, and other senior military personnel with responsibility for StratCom (strategic communication) operations are closely involved in the programme.
The activities of the II include:
Setting up covert networks - known as clusters - of journalists, academics, and military/foreign service StratCom practitioners in each country including the UK:
The programme has begun to create a critical mass of individuals from across society (think tanks, academia, politics, the media, government and the military) whose work is proving to be mutually reinforcing.
Covert manipulation of the general populous, including campaign to smear and suppress dissenters and block their appointment to public office [2]. The “silencing of ‘pro-Kremlin’ voices on Serbian TV” is listed as an “achievement”.
Attacks on British politicians, academics, and other critics of the UK government - notably Nigel Farage and Jeremy Corbyn.
Working closely with organisations that foment hatred of ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltic states and Ukraine - encouraging Holocaust revisionism.
Promotion of hate campaigns against the Russian Orthodox Church in the Balkans.
These activities, of course:
Are not the charitable purposes set out in the IoS mission statement and constitution.
Violate the principle that government funding not be used for partisan political agendas.
Indicate that the government has/had misled the House of Commons about the true scope of the Russian Language Programme of the Conflict Security and Stability Fund.
Indicate that military units specialised in information warfare now participate in subverting parliamentary government.
Have contributed to narrowing the range of public discourse so as to marginalised reality-based evaluation of policy options for relations with Russia, and evidence-based assessment of events in which Russian involvement is alleged.
The initiative is predominantly financed by the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), the US State Department, and NATO, in addition to some occasional funding provided by Facebook and German tech companies.
2. THE MIND BEHIND THE FACTION
Now to focus on the main mind behind the II, Chris Donnelly. Born 10th November 1946, Donnelly is a UK deep-politician who was a “special adviser” to four NATO secretary generals for 13 years, as well as to the former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Donnelly personally wrote several of the documents involved in the II leak that suggest that he is suffering from a permanent war mentality, and that he sees the world in a one-dimensional “for us or against us” term - akin to the language used in George Bush’s speech when announcing the ‘war on terror’. A 2003 NATO biography stated that Donnelly’s current major interests include [3]:
… The reform of defence and security establishments in Central and Eastern European countries following the end of the Cold War.
Donnelly is additionally, as mentioned previously, the co-director of the IoS, one of the federal bodies that oversees the II. Among the documents lifted by an anonymous source from the servers of the IoS were several papers and memos written by Donnelly himself, which ultimately show a lack of realistic strategic thought, and a Russophobic mindset [4].
Chris Donnelly’s British passport as of December 2014.
From Donnelly’s CV [5], we learn that he is a long-time soldier in the British Army Intelligence Corps, where he established the Soviet Studies Research Centre at RMA Sandhurst, and where he was also later involved in creating the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Ft Leavenworth. In addition, Donnelly is a “Security and Justice Senior Mentor” of the UK’s Stabilisation Unit, which ironically is really tasked with destabilising various foreign countries who do not align with their interests and ideologies [6].
During his tenure as a military intelligence analyst in the 1980s, Donnelly authored several books and papers about the Soviet Union and its military. In addition, amongst a “private-confidential” report by the IoS on "‘The Challenge of Brexit to the UK: Case study - The Foreign and Commonwealth Offices”, his mindset is encapsulated throughout [7]. The following is an excerpt from Donnelly’s writing:
Our problem is that, for the last 70 years or so, we in the UK and Europe have been living in a safe, secure rules-based system which has allowed us to enjoy a holiday from history … Unfortunately, this state of affairs is now being challenged. A new paradigm of conflict is replacing the 19th & 20th century paradigm … In this new paradigm, the clear distinction which most people have been able to draw between war and peace, their expectation of stability and a degree of predictability in life, are being replaced by a volatile unpredictability, a permanent state of instability in which war and peace become ever more difficult to disentangle. The “classic” understanding of conflict being between two distinct players or groups of players is giving way to a world of Darwinian competition where all the players - nation states, sub-state actors, big corporations, ethnic or religious groups, and so on - are constantly striving with each other in a “war of all against all”. The Western rules-based system, which more westerners take for granted and have come to believe is “normal”, is under attack from countries and organisations which wish to replace our system with theirs. This is not a crisis which faces us; it is a strategic challenge, and from several directions simultaneously.
In reality however, the “Western rules-based system”, fully implemented after the demise of the Soviet Union, is a concept under which the collective West arbitrarily make up rules, and anyone who disagrees, is either threatened, smeared, or outright killed. Witness the wars against Serbia, the war on Iraq, the destruction of Libya, the intervention in Kosovo, the Western-led coup d’état in Ukraine, the funding of Azov Nazis in Ukraine, the war by Western-funded waahabist proxies against the people of Syria and Iraq, the illegal occupations in Somalia, the smearing of Edward Snowden, and the shameful extradition of Julian Assange [8]. None of these actions were legal or justified under international law, but as we’ve come to see in recent times, international law has now been binned, and the collective West do as they please. The current shift to a multipolar world is not an attempt to replace “our system with theirs”, but merely a return to the way things should be - global diplomacy, whereby sovereign countries can rule and represent themselves, working for their own prosperities, not for those of the United States.
In October 2016, Donnelly had a private discussion with General Sir Richard Barrons [9], marked as personal and confidential. Barrons for context, is a former commander of the British Joint Forces Command. The nonsensical top line is: “The UK defence model is failing. UK is at real risk”. Some additional bites from the leaked conversation again reveal the extent of Donnelly’s paranoid mindset. The discussion also includes some musings about the British military posture at the time:
There has been a progressive, systemic demobilisation of NATO military capability and a run down of all its members’ defences … We are seeing new/reinvented ways of warfare - hybrid, plus the reassertion of hard power in warfare … Aircraft carriers can be useful for lots of things, but not for war (against) China or Russia, so we should equip them accordingly … The West no longer has a military edge on Russia … Our nuclear programme drains resources from conventional forces and hollows them out … The UK Brigade in Germany is no good as a deterrent against Russia … Our battalion in Estonia are hostages, not a detterent.
The General lamented the lack of influence the military has on the British government and its people in response. He argued for more government financed think-tank research that can be fed back into the government:
So, if no catastrophe happens to wake people up and demand a response, then we need to find a way to get the core of government to realise the problem and take it out of the political space. We will need to impose changes over the heads of vested interests. NB We did this in the 1930s … My conclusion is that it is we who must either generate the debate or wait for something dreadful to happen to shock us into action. We must generate an independent debate outside government … We need to ask when and how do we start to put all this right? Do we have the national capabilities/capacities to fix it? If so, how do we improve our harnessing of resources to do it? We need this debate now. There is not a moment to be lost.
This, in hindsight, was an order from the core of the British thinking to encourage Donnelly to get even deeper into the inner-British influence business. i.e, hype Russia as a threat, so more money can be taken from the “vested interests” of the people and pumped into the MIC. This particular advice of Barrons was accepted, and in 2017, the II bid for funding from the Ministry of Defence for various projects to influence the general populous, parliament, the military, and the government, as well as foreign forces [10]. The bid document lists “performance indicators” that are supposed to measure the success of the II’s activities:
5. Performance Indicators
Tougher stance in government policy towards Russia
Better understanding of the military threat to the UK
More information published in the media on the threat of Russian active measures
Growth of network across Europe
Increase in number of followers on Twitter
Increased education of young generation on disinformation and threats posed by social media
Greater awareness in all areas of society of the threat posed by Russian active measures to UK’s democratic institutions
Asking for government finance to influence that same government to take a ‘tougher stance towards Russia’ seems a bit circular. However, this is consistent with the operation of other Anglo-American think-tanks and policy initiatives in which one part of the government, usually the hawkish one, secretly uses NGO's and think-tanks to lobby other parts of the government to support their specific hobbyhorse and budget. Luckily, such lobbying operations are mostly run by arrogant bureaucrats and oligarchs who are incompetent in the specific field that they lobby for. Using Donnelly as an example, despite a life-long experience in military intelligence, Donnelly clearly has no competence when it comes to military strategic planning. In March 2014, following the vote of Crimea to split from Ukraine, Donnelly suggested military measures to be taken by Ukraine with regards to Crimea [11]:
If I were in charge I would get the following implemented
Set up a cordon sanitaire across the Crimean Isthmus and on the coast of N. of Crimea with troops and mines
Mine Sevastopol harbour/bay. Can be done easily using a car ferry if they have no minelayers. Doesn’t need a lot of mines to be effective. They could easily buy some mines.
Get their air force into the air and activate all their air defences. If they can’t fly the Migs on the airfield in Crimea those should be destroyed as a gesture that they are serious. Going “live” electronically will worry the Russians as the Ukrainians have the same electronic kit. If the Russians jam it they jam their own kit as well.
Ukraine used to have some seriously important weapons, such as a big microwave anti-satellite weapon. If they still have this, they should use it.
The government needs a Strategic communication campaign-so far everything is coming from Moscow. They need to articulate a long-term vision that will inspire the people, however hard that is to do. Without it, what have people to fight for?
They should ask the west now to start supplying Oil and gas. There is plenty available due to the mild winter.
I am trying to get this message across.
Think for a moment if Donnelly did genuinely get his musings across. How would Russia have responded to a mining of Sevastopol harbour, the frying of its satellites, or the destruction of its fighter jets in Crimea? They would have been received, and justifiably so, as acts of war, against the forces of the largest nuclear power in the world, which were legally stationed in Crimea following a democratically formulated referendum. In addition, how would the West have immediately supplied LNG to Ukraine, when Ukraine’s pipeline was designed to uni-directionally receive gas from Russia? This nature of incompetence is a common occurrence with Donnelly and his II faction of propagandists.
3. FUNDING
The domain name integrityinitiative.net was first registered on 22nd June 2015 [12]. In this year up until 23rd November 2015, the Institute received £46,639, described as “funding from FW Investments Partnership, Foreign Office, Centre for Naval Analysis (a US government funded think-tank), CAFOD for various for national and international initiatives” [13]. In the year up to 23rd November 2016, the Institute received:
£87,250 unrestricted funds, described as “designated funds for various UK security, NHS, Royal Navy, NATO, Ukrainian and Russian research programmes”.
£33,441 described as “funding from Dulverton Trust and the FCO for a national and international programme”.
There is no explicit support for the creation of the II until the year to 23rd November 2017, when the Institute received £307,000 from a “private donor” for the II, and the first £124,567 from a £250,000 Foreign Office grant for the financial years 2017/18.
The applications to the FCO request funding from a body named the ‘Russian Language Strategic Communication Programme (RLSCP)’, which is just the Russian Language Programme (RLP) of the Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) mentioned previously. The RLSCP is described in the UK Government’s response [14] on 20th July 2017 to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on the UK’s relations with Russia [15], published four months prior:
The FCO-led Russian Language Programme brings together expertise from the FCO, MOD, and DFID as well as external experts to co-ordinate a set of projects worth some £70m over four years. These projects seek to enhance independent media; to engage with Russian speakers; and to expose Russian Government disinformation … Through this programme, the Government is working with a range of partners to enhance the quality of public and independent Russian language media so that it is able to provide Russian-speakers with reliable access to accurate information. The type of support given includes mentoring with UK media organisations; consultancy on programming; funded co-productions and support for regional Russian language media initiatives.
The quite obvious anti-Russian tone of the material published by the II and its partners, including promotion of what appears to be a hate campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church in the Baltics, would be very unlikely to find welcome amongst Russian speakers. Yet the title of the programme and the government’s description make clear that the stated objective of the II was to counter disinformation and provide reliable information in the Russian language. Of course, they get to define what disinformation is, and no concrete definition is ever give, thus making it malleable to their liking. Parliamentary oversight swept aside, the remit appears to have been changed to include operations in other languages including English media in the UK. As the IoS application was dated 23rd April 2017, and the government response was dated 20th July 2017, it is clear that the government misled the Foreign Affairs Committee. In a laughable attempt to explain this situation, Sir Alan Duncan, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office gave a misleading reply to a question on the matter [16]:
In April 2016 we launched a new four year strategic communications and media development programme authorised by the National Security Council, called the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme. The former Russian Language Programme was amalgamated into this. The funding provided to the Institute of Statecraft was funded from the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme.
Duncan does not say when the RLP was amalgamated into the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme, and does not explicitly say that all funding to the Institute was provided from this programme, although this would be a natural interpretation of his reply. This document [17], shows that the RLP, one of the components of the CSSF, was still current in the financial year 2017-18 with annual expenditure of £8m. The first year of funding for the II must therefore have been awarded from this programme, as implied by the application for 2017/18. It is now difficult to read Duncan’s answer as anything but an attempt to mislead the MP’s without having to actually tell a lie.
In the CSSF summaries for the year 2018/19, neither the RLP or the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme are listed, which implies that either the CDMD is not part of the CSSF, or that it is secret [18]. However, it is possible to identify recipients from tables of the FCO’s monthly expenditure [19], which show spending between £100,000 and £200,000 per month on the IoS, although these do not identify the programme from which this funding is coming. The total cost of the project for the financial year 2017/18 was given as £582,635, of which £480,635 was from the FCO, with the rest coming from NATO, “partner institutions”, and the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence. The budget projection for 2018/19 gave a budget of £1.96m for the funding requested from the FCO in 2018/19 [20]. The answer to a parliamentary question confirmed that this was awarded in full by the Foreign Office [21].
Co-funding of the II for 2018/19 is listed:
Funding from HQ NATO Public Diplomacy, £12,000 for each inaugural workshop = £168,000
Funding from partner institutions, £5,000 for each inaugural workshop = £70,000
Funding from NATO HQ for educational video films - free provision of camera team
Funding from Lithuanian MOD to provide free [of] all costs for their StratCom team for a monthly trip to support a new hub/cluster creation, and to educate cluster leaders and key people in Vilnius in infowar techniques = £20,000
Funding from the US State Dept, £250,000 for research and dissemination activities (excluding any activity in USA)
Funding from Smith Richardson Foundation, £45,000 for cluster activities in Europe and USA
Funding from Facebook, £100,000 for research and education activities
Funding from German business community, £25,000 for research and dissemination in EU countries
Those listed would give a total income of £2.6m for 2018/19. This does not include office costs, for which no funding source is given. The accounts filed for the years ending 23rd November 2016 and 23rd November 2017, state that the IoS had no employees from 2015 to 2017, implying that another agency was employing them and seconding them to work on the programme. The budget submitted to the FCO for 2018/19 for the II includes salary costs for only four staff including Donnelly, though another document lists 18 individuals as the “Temple Place resident team”.
[ The “Temple Place resident team” of the IoS is listed as: Simon Bracey Lane, Stephen Dalziel, Maria de Goeij, Nico de Pedro, Yusuf Desai, Chris Donnelly, Euan Grant, Charlie Hatton, Chris Hernon, Todd Leventhal, Victor Madeira, Johanna Moehring, Ben Robinson, Greg Rowett, Keith Sargent, Jon Searle, Guy Spindler, James Wilson. ] [ “Specialist team members” are listed as: Eduard Abrahamyan, Diane Allen, Jamal Al-Tahat, Josh Arnold-Foster, Barrie Axford, Anne Bader, Qique Badia-Masoni, Oleksandr Danylyuk, Martin Dubbey, Harold Elletson, Perry Fawcett, Mark Galeotti, Babak Ganji, Francis Ghiles, Keir Giles, Glen Grant, Roger Golland, Jon Hazel, Steve Johnson, Phil Jolley, Stephen Jolly, Ren Kapur, Dan Kaszeta, Dmytro Kolomoiets, Karel Kullamaa, Birgy Lorenz, John Lough, Tim Reilly, Alan Riley, Andy Settle, James Sherr, Andrew Shortland, Luis Simon, Henry Strickland, Tomas Tauginas, Jason Wiseman, Sir Andrew Wood. ]
The State Department properly stipulates that the grant funding it provides may not be spent within the United States. The UK FCO appear to have no such qualms about funding covert political activities within their own country however.
The II handbook [22] instructs staff to say, if asked about funding, that:
The IfS [IoS] gets its funding from multiple sources to ensure its independence. These include: private individuals, charitable foundations; international organisations (EU, NATO); UK Govt (FCO, MOD).
There is no other mention in the documents of funding from the UK Ministry of Defence. The plan was that the ‘clusters’ eventually be sustained by longer-term funding from NATO and the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA):
HQ NATO PDD [Public Diplomacy Division] has proved a reliable source of funding for national clusters. The ATA promises to be the same, giving access to other pots of money within NATO and member nations.
Thus, the role of NATO here we can conclude, is not one of collective defence, but instead one of political manipulation within its member countries.
4. THE UK CLUSTER
The UK cluster document lists the following groups, indicating that the II’s ambitions extended to other policy issues, including NHS reform:
GIG (Governance and Integrity Group) – one name
NHS Reform Group – no names yet
Communication Engagement & Dialogue Group – no names yet
Defence Acquisition Reform Group – no names yet
Office Core Team – Fellows
Office Core Team – Associates
UK General – Inner Core – Russia
UK General – Inner Core – Military & Defence
UK General – Outer Core – Russia
UK General – Outer Core – Military & Defence
UK Journalists
From the expenditure records and budgets, it appears that the majority of the cluster members who weren’t employees of the Institute, were unpaid, with the exception of a few consultancy payments for specific tasks such as preparing a report. A more subtle incentive to take part in such a scheme would have been the advantages of being on the inside, networking with senior government officials and military intelligence specialists. All concerned would know that this would open doors to future posts, consultancies and grant funding. On this basis, participants in such a network could reasonably be expected to declare their membership as a competing interest, whatever their personal motives for participating.
I have established that some of those included on the cluster lists had simply been on mailing lists, usually because they had attended a meeting organised by the IoS. However, it is still relevant to study these individuals as this may reveal the groups that the II were trying to attract.
The procedure for the inaugural cluster foundation workshop, is described in the budget document for 2018/19 as follows:
Connect cluster members, create internal national network, formally introduce them to the Integrity Initiative aims, practices and methodologies, establish target programme for research, dissemination and events.
New cluster able to self-organised. Increased coordination and shared best practice from cluster individuals and organisations working at the forefront of efforts countering RU disinfo, increased resource material for an Int’l audience.
Initial group of at least 8 members between core hub and network. Members agree team roles and start putting structures in place. Start exchanges of information with other clusters. Begin work on research and dissemination activities.
5. PARTNERS LISTED BY THE II
The partner organisations of the II make up a nexus of NATO-connected think-tanks, including the Centre for European Reform, the Henry Jackson Society, and the Atlantic Council. Many individuals from these think-tanks are also listed in the cluster documents. The following are the partner organisations listed on the II’s website:
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
The Beacon Project – The domain name,
beaconproject.info, was registered on 19 April 2016 in Bratislava. This appears to be a project announced by the International Republican Institute in April 2016 that has never gone live [23].Centre for European Policy Analysis (Washington DC) – Mission is “to promote an economically vibrant, strategically secure, and politically free Europe with close and enduring ties to the United States.” Edward Lucas was the Senior Vice-President.
European Values (Czechia) – “Non-governmental policy institute defending liberal democracy” led by Jakub Janda, who is named in the documents as a member of one of the clusters.
Kremlin Watch (Czechia) – a strategic program of the European Values Think-Tank
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute (Hungary)
University of Macedonia Public Opinion Research Unit
Res – Public Affairs. Corporate Affairs GmbH (Berlin)
In addition to those listed above, you also have StopFake - there are multiple references to the II’s relations in the 2018 application and budget plan:
We also worked with Stopfake in Ukraine, examining the excellent work done on this by them and their partners.
We also arranged for the Lithuanian team to provide training on a regular basis for all our cluster leaders in the methodology of tracking and exposing Russian malign influence and disinformation, and linked them directly to the Ukrainian Stopfake leadership and to the UK LSE team (whom we took to Vilnius) to exchange practical experience.
Provide guest articles from IfS and our clusters for StopFake’s printed material published and distributed along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine.
Sending cluster members to educational sessions abroad (IREX, Detector Media, StopFake, EUvsDisinfo, LT MOD Stratcom).
A modular training programme (based on IREX/StopFake material) that adapts media source examples as needed to be most relevant and accessible across our cluster network.
StopFake received £80,145 from the FCO directly in April 2018 [24].
6. BALTIC & UKRAINIAN EXTREMISM
Holocaust Revisionism
The II, as mentioned and shown previously, works closely with the Lithuanian government and armed forces. The officially-encouraged spread of Holocaust revisionism in the Baltic states has been documented in detail by the magazine, Defending History. Lithuania and Latvia passed laws that limit discourse about the Holocaust in their territories, and deny the role of local helpers in the Nazi genocide [25]. In 2015, Ukraine passed a law that assigned officially protected status to the OUN and other organisations that collaborated with the Nazis and played a key role in the mass murder of Jews, as well as those Nazis that partook in the violent Euromaidan riots in 2013 and 2014 [26].
Both the Lithuanian [27] and Latvian [28] governments, promote the double genocide version of Holocaust revisionism [29], which equates the (undisputed) political repression in the Baltic states during the years of Soviet rule, to the genocide directed against the Jewish populations of those countries. In November 2010, the-then UK ambassador to Lithuania, Simon Butt, drafted and sent a letter to the President of Lithuania, co-signed by the ambassadors of Estonia, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, that expressed concern over the growing manifestations of antisemitism and denounced the “double genocide” version of history unequivocally [30]:
Spurious attempts are made to equate the uniquely evil genocide of the Jews with Soviet crimes against Lithuania, which, though great in magnitude, cannot be regarded as equivalent in either their intention or result.
In May 2011, Butt retired at the age of 53, and was replaced by David Hunt.
The II documents report that Lithuanian armed forces have been training the British Army’s 77th Brigade:
Lithuania has become particularly important in our network due to its expertise in dealing with Russian malign influence and disinformation. We currently have four centres of expertise in Lithuania. Since 2015 we have had a close link with the Lithuanian Armed Forces Stratcom team, currently drawing on their expertise, with the support of the Lithuanian Chief of Defence, to educate other national clusters on effective methodologies for tracking Russian activities. We initiated a link between this team and the UK 77 Bde, resulting in 77 Bde adopting the Lithuanian techniques.
Neo-Nazism
As mentioned previously, the II works closely with StopFake, which has downplayed or denied resurgence of Nazism in the Baltic states and Ukraine. For instance, in this article [31], StopFake defends the use of military boot-camps for children, run by the Azov Battalion [32]. The Azov Battalion was founded in 2014, and its first commander was Andriy Biletsky, who previously headed the neo-Nazi group Patriot of Ukraine.
StopFake has defended Ukrainian parliamentary speaker Andriy Parubiy against French commentators who denounced him as a Nazi [33]. StopFake defended Parubiy following his visit to France, saying that Parubiy is now “on the centre-right” in Ukrainian politics. As the centre-ground in Ukrainian politics is now aligned with policies, that in most other European countries, would be identified as those of the extreme right, it is difficult to dispute the assertion that Parubiy is on the centre-right in Ukrainian politics. A detailed study by Katchanoski implicated Parubiy’s group in which is now widely held to have been a false-flag massacre of Maidan protestors on 20th February 2014 [34, 35].
7. ‘RELIGION AS A WEAPON’
The II handbook and the UK cluster document list Victor Madeira, as part of the Office Core Team with an expertise on “The Orthodox Church”. The slide-show presentation that he prepared for a meeting at the University of Macedonia (Thessaloniki) on 12th November 2018 has the title, “The Russian Orthodox Church: A State Tool of Malign Influence” [36]. The opening slide is a cartoon, that, with some substitution of religious identifiers, would not have been out of place in the pages of Der Stürmer. It shows the face of an Orthodox cleric as the front of a locomotive, holding what appears to be a purse. Other parts of the locomotive are labelled with dollar signs, a hammer and sickle, and the name Russkiy Mir (the Russian cultural foundation). A uniformed driver with rat-like features leans out of the engine room, which is labelled USSR.
The II handbook lists one of the “topics for research” as “The Russian Orthodox Church and religion as weapons”. The slide-show presentation and the quotes below make clear that the Russian Orthodox Church itself is viewed as the threat, and not just wealthy donors to the Church like the Greek-Russian businessman Ivan Savvidis:
Savvidis’s role is to prep the ground for the expansion of the Orthodox church in turn the expansion of Russian control over Greece. Persuading them they belong to the Eastern world, not the western.
The Orthodox religion is an important weapon which Russia is using. The Russian patriarch is trying to exceed the influence of the Greek patriarch. The Montenegrin church is trying to sabotage discussion of religion and security. Montenegro and other Balkan Orthodox religions look to Serbia and Russia, not to Greece.
Two individuals with current or past affiliation to the Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales (CBCEW), the governing body of the Catholic Church in England, appear in the UK Cluster document. Dr David Ryall, Secretary of the International Affairs Department of the CBCEW, appears under “UK General – Inner Core – Military & Defence”. Primavera Quantrill, who held a post in the CBCEW from 2002 to 2005 and is now Partnerships Director at the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, appears under “Outer Core – Military & Defence”. Although there is no evidence that these individuals were involved with the II, it is of interest that those running the programme apparently sought to involve officials of the Catholic Church.
8. UK MOD DOCUMENT ACRONYMS
The acronyms embedded in the local-parts of the MOD email addresses listed in the documents give some clue to the scale of StratCom operations now overseen by the UK Ministry of Defence:
SGMI – Specialist Group Military Intelligence, based at at Denison Barracks, Hermitage, Thatcham, Berkshire. SGMI is part of the 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade which became operational on 1st September 2014. Among the other units in 1 ISR are 21 and 23 Special Air Service Regiments, 1-7 Military Intelligence Battalions, the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre and the Defence Cultural and Linguistic Support Unit. Overall it has 3,300 regular and 3,000 reservist personnel. According to the army, “approximately 55% of the Intelligence Corps is employed within the 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Brigade” [37].
77X – 77th Brigade also based at Denison Barracks and responsible for “information activity”. According to an FoI [38], the 77th Brigade (in mid 2018) included 203 regular Army posts of which 190 were filled and 271 reserve posts of which 150 were filled, making a total strength of 340 personnel.
PJHQ – Permanent Joint Headquarters, based in Northwood
J2 – operational intelligence division of PJHQ
CGS – Office of Chief of General Staff (Head of the Army)
MSE – Military Strategic Effects, part of the Operations Directorate in Whitehall. This branch was established around 1999 to 2000 when it was named Targeting and Information Operations. It was renamed Military Strategic effects in 2013. In mid 2018, according to an FoI disclosure, it contained 34 staff. From March 2014 to July 2015 it was headed by Chris Brazier, from then till March 2018 by Commodore Jonathan Burr, and since then by Air Commodore Nigel Colman.
FSECC – Full Spectrum Effects Coordination Cell, a cross-department group set up in 2015 and overseen by a senior Tasking and Oversight Board chaired by Gwyn Jenkins (Deputy National Security Adviser for Conflict, Stability & Defence). The cell is based in MoD in Whitehall, and according to a former member is “in co-operation with the Cabinet Office, HMT, FCO, DfID, Home Office, GCHQ, MI5 and SIS, principally against ISIL/Daesh”.
9. DOCUMENTS
UK-related documents
FCO application form 2017/18 - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/fco-application-form-2017-18/
FCO application 2018 v2 - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/fco-application-form-2018-v2/
FCO proposal II budget 2017/18 - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/fco-proposal-integrity-budget-2017-18/
II handbook v2 - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/iihandbookv2/
II guide to countering Russian ‘disinformation’ - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/untitled-pdf-document-1/
Cluster roundup July 2018 (Progress report) - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/clusterroundupjul18/
Cluster leaders - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/cluster-leaders/
Cluster participants - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/cluster-participants/
xcountry (Table of countries with election dates, individuals associated with II … ) - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/xcountry/
Moncloa campaign (Timeline of social media output during Integrity Initiative’s successful campaign to block the appointment of Colonel Pedro Baños Bajo to the post of head of the National Security Directorate of Spain) - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/moncloa-campaign-6-atttwitter080618/
UK cluster - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/uk-cluster/
Other regional/national clusters
Austria - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/austria-cluster/
Baltics - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/baltics-cluster/
Central-Eastern - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/central-eastern-cluster/
France - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/france-cluster/
Germany - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/germany-cluster/
Greece - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/greece-cluster/
Italy - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/italy-cluster/
Netherlands - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/netherlands-cluster/
Nordic - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/nordic-cluster/
Spain - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/spain-cluster/
North America - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/north-america-cluster/
Visits by Ukrainian officers
Schedule - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/visit-of-ukrainian-reserve-officers-programme-11-07-2016/
Invoice from the IoS to MoD for the visit of 2 Ukrainian officers - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/k0584-00/
Other
“Ideas for ramping up IfS Contributions to the Cause” (Memorandum by Victor Madeira. One suggestion is “find ways to remove e.g. RT/Ruptly video and infographic content from mainstream media”) - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/ramping-up-ifs-work-16-03-2018/
II 2018 staff presentations and media interviews - https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/ii-media-interviews-2018/
10. REFERENCES
[1] https://swprs.org/die-integrity-initiative/
[2] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/moncloa-campaign-6-atttwitter080618/
[3] https://www.nato.int/cv/is/sp-adv/donnelly.htm
[4] https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/operation-integrity-initiative-british-informational-war-against-all-part-3/
[5] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/0000-cnd-cv-short-aug-2017/0000-cnd-cv-short-aug-2017.pdf
[6] https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit
[7] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/brexit-fco-update-02-02-2018/
[8] https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/julian-assange-extradite-us-espionage-charges-priti-patel-b1006762.html
[9] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/richard-barrons-oct-2016/
[10] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/bid-for-mod-funding-140317/
[11] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/00-military-measures/
[12] https://www.domainbigdata.com/integrityinitiative.net/
[13] https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/document-api-images-live.ch.gov.uk/docs/1OeVuirbqVuI_aHFKVATsN9VFWDHFI0sPux1xNrPyiQ/application-pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAWRGBDBV3AI5WUKTL%2F20220623%2Feu-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20220623T165555Z&X-Amz-Expires=60&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFsaCWV1LXdlc3QtMiJHMEUCIQDRejtZGwbM%2FC6DeHJdA9zLDzaiiyn0VK5fNX%2F7bgHg5QIgCPb1dWkSuQDxFQhLuqnLghealikjFLQTXit%2FRhflYVoq0wQIdBAEGgw0NDkyMjkwMzI4MjIiDKydiiwGa46RceC0WyqwBNCkwjMeHAXTLfpcc15TQ9fDhr1CLm76NkOBTVOeBky9J1BiLycD5yZSS9IGe%2F0Ul5k6jLwtfmpz07ZzY4gMgBtMtxRZV6gg3e7Dj%2F5ricoAics8QbKVKiD%2BYJPYpW0F96%2FjompJ4whFbS9RGAuFWkwIJnHVHqwrmVZnseHfcXcRuOPv%2BotylR5%2F%2B8Fexq895jRHRyRs2VLqiPComzUOAaoESemHmwbjRMHaF4BMmidGs1twbpRSP84gLay2onIu%2FukYoJUZLEkdhE0kwJDVnxhFy2DBG4ZGH9GjHjxnbI8KPTPJhAwXlNJSZhMZvavf9aT6gbnRkju4zoFXEcaYgaPTlUpg9P79RRnC%2BV8EphenIyDn1VP6anhkQrQ%2BCzaassTHZ1UhIuoQUu0aChBH1NnsyZadH2gqB5If1oSpJKqdZ77LiYRmyN3bZf0t%2Fp%2BzjYVUiddqTj%2BOeNJbpnwFoufGUIS%2FfwXSI4W2Qdz9mLPjPJjap7w7IJOCcO0HGnddnKqA5PmF9nhtg8ZNnXgoEkm4v3b3F46C7pxGh4RqzTXQGURtvkAfE01D%2F7%2FX2B4h1ZE7hMkMf0p6Hz%2F6LofQnExGeowmF%2FQAcKmZA0%2FFtcY72Y7MGdk6w9IYtHFOkmYHAwnnvjjajy7SDUpzdQThfFdyUZbVGr289HWaB4CUF1BbgtfNe3sEmEes00N9rYGBjeAPiCanwXS7lDkSIjlU9ARqA%2FlivPs5fNSvkuLdLs%2FfMNqU0ZUGOqkB5tVk2Zj4yvgtvIL1Z9khI5ZTOatflQeRrywfqUWKNXYxkP0K4o53hvmOohqbA%2B9TJZVee9uA%2BQUrQcB6b1%2FAujng050UL2auyeNjN86Yenc7%2B8ldfUMHpq7WzktSiqq1xWhawLAs8qjEElNN%2BeKH1X26UZDY%2FvsEPJuWI2fV3FUNqDGGKtGM0BsWBT1EVHCMrDV4twpMBtszVHAjSPRBniaHQC9Npfy1Hg%3D%3D&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&response-content-disposition=inline%3Bfilename%3D%22companies_house_document.pdf%22&X-Amz-Signature=7de7ba39c5a8264258bea3da7cdb515bf76b4ee035e065b9f344ea03a2c18e67
[14] https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/332/33202.htm
[15] https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/120/120.pdf
[16] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2018-12-04/198811
[17] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630285/Russian_Language_EECAD_2017.pdf
[18] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security
[19] https://www.gov.uk/search/transparency-and-freedom-of-information-releases?content_store_document_type=transparency&organisations%5B%5D=foreign-commonwealth-office
[20] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/integrity2018activitybudgetv3/
[21] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2018-11-27/196177
[22] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/iihandbookv2/
[23] https://www.iri.org/news/beacon-project-shines-light-on-moscows-meddling/
[24] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/710446/Spend_over__25K_April_2018.csv/preview
[25] https://www.jta.org/2018/02/06/global/poland-isnt-the-only-country-trying-to-police-what-can-be-said-about-the-holocaust
[26] https://politkrytyka.org/2015/04/29/laws-2558-and-2538-1-on-critical-inquiry-the-holocaust-and-academic-freedom-in-ukraine/
[27] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/14/double-genocide-lithuania-holocaust-communism
[28] http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=91593
[29] https://defendinghistory.com/category/double-genocide
[30] https://defendinghistory.com/ambassadors-protest-antisemitism-in-lithuania/6362
[31] https://www.stopfake.org/en/schools-of-hate-fakes-and-manipulation-about-ukraine-boot-camps-for-children/
[32] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-azov-idUSKBN0ML0XJ20150325
[33] https://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-ukrainian-parliamentary-speaker-called-neo-nazi-and-anti-semite/
[34] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658245
[35] https://mediasetinfinity.mediaset.it/video/matrix/esclusivo-guerra-in-ucraina-le-verita-nascoste_F308550501019C12
[36] https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/28/v-madeiragr-seminar121118/
[37] https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/intelligence-corps/
[38] https://powerbase.info/images/0/02/David_Miller_2018-06239.pdf
With credit to https://www.syriapropagandamedia.org/